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Abstract—Ultra-reliable and low-latency communication
(URLLC) is one category of service to be provided by
next-generation wireless networks. Motivated by increasing
security concerns in such networks, this article focuses on
physical layer security (PLS) in the context of URLLC. The
PLS technique mainly uses transmission designs based on
the intrinsic randomness of the wireless medium to achieve
secrecy. As such, PLS is of lower complexity and incurs less
latency than traditional cryptography. In this article, we first
introduce appropriate performance metrics for evaluating PLS
in URLLC, illustrating the tradeoff between latency, reliability,
and security. We then identify the key challenging problems for
achieving PLS for URLLC, and discuss the role that channel
state information can have in providing potential solutions to
these problems. Finally, we present our recommendations on
future research directions in this emerging area.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, ultra-reliable and low-
latency, URLLC, wireless communication security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Next-generation wireless networks (fifth generation and
beyond) will be fundamentally different from previous genera-
tions in many regards. Perhaps most importantly (and contrary
to earlier generations of wireless networks which focused on
data rate as the single most important requirement), next-
generation wireless networks will have ultra-reliable and low-
latency communication (URLLC) as a requirement. URLLC
is envisioned to enable the wireless exchange of data packets
with ultra-high reliability (error probability on the order of
10−7) and ultra-low latency (end-to-end delay on the order
of 1 ms) [1]. Such communication embodies a new wireless
paradigm in which “click-and-wait” communications are re-
placed by dependable real-time interactive communications.
In this new paradigm, the assurance of ultra-high reliability
creates confidence that wireless communications can be used
even in life-threatening circumstances, while ultra-low latency
ensures real-time functionality in time-critical interactive com-
munications. The emergence of URLLC will enable many
new time-critical applications such as autonomous networked
vehicles, next-generation factory automation, tele-surgery and
the Tactile internet [2], thereby opening up lucrative new
business opportunities for many industrial sectors. As such, a
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large amount of research effort has been dedicated to URLLC
in recent years. Such research efforts continue to grow, with an
increasing resolve to find technical solutions to the somewhat
contradictory requirements of ultra-high reliability and ultra-
low latency.
Although the key requirements of URLLC are mainly
related to reliability and latency, security issues are also critical
in most application scenarios of URLLC. For example, in
addition to ultra-low latency and ultra-high reliability, other
key requirements arising from the nature of the Tactile internet
are security and privacy [1]. In addition, the leakage of critical
and confidential information in some applications of URLLC
may lead to attacks that are difficult to defend against. We
present an example in Fig. 1 to further demonstrate this point,
where T1 is the time when we have the scenario on the
left-half figure and T2 is the time when the scenario shown
on the right-half figure. In this figure, we show that if an
eavesdropper obtains a legitimate vehicle’s message together
with its random sequence (used for authentication) through
eavesdropping, the eavesdropper can successfully replace the
legitimate message (i.e., “slow down” sent by the green car
in Fig. 1) with some misleading information (i.e., “speed
up” sent by the eavesdropper in Fig. 1) within vehicular
networks. Such misleading information can potentially result
in fatal accidents [3]. We note that this example demonstrates
the importance of both the information confidentiality and
message integrity, since the leaked random sequence leads
to the fake misleading information being accepted (message
integrity is not guaranteed). A brief discussion on the impor-
tance of message integrity in the context of URLLC can be
found in [4] and in this work we focus on the information
confidentiality. We also note that information confidentiality
is widely addressed by cryptography algorithms in traditional
communications. However, in the context of URLLC, cryptog-
raphy algorithms may violate ultra-low latency requirements
due to the high-complexity signal processing required by
encryption and decryption [1]. In addition, the key distribution
required by cryptograph solutions may cause extra delay in
some application scenarios.
Different from traditional cryptography algorithms, physical
layer security mainly utilizes transmission techniques, and
the inherent properties of the wireless medium, to achieve
secrecy [5]. In the wiretap channel model for physical layer
security, a transmitter, Alice, sends confidential information
to a legitimate receiver, Bob, while an eavesdropper, Eve,
attempts to interpret this confidential information by eaves-
dropping on Alice’s transmission. One advantage of physical
layer security techniques is that they do not require key distri-
2Fig. 1. An attack scenario in vehicular ad-hoc networks showing the
criticalness of URLLC security.
bution or encryption/decryption. Thus, physical layer security
can potentially defend against eavesdropping attacks without
violating the ultra-low latency requirement of URLLC. Going
forward, therefore, physical layer security may well be the
main security technology invoked to protect URLLC in next-
generation wireless networks.
Physical layer security has previously been widely studied
in wireless communications, but largely without consideration
of an ultra-low latency or ultra-high reliability constraint.
As such, many fundamental questions about physical layer
security in the context of URLLC remain unclear. For example,
“What are the proper secrecy metrics used to evaluate physical
layer security in URLLC scenarios?” is just one of these ques-
tions. Due to the finite (and small) blocklengths considered in
URLLC, the decoding error probabilities at both Bob and Eve
are not negligible in wiretap channels. Another consequence of
small blocklengths is that many widely-used secrecy metrics
cannot be used to evaluate the performance of physical layer
security in URLLC scenarios. For example, the well-known
secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability both require
an infinite blocklength n. In addition, the information-theoretic
strong secrecy and weak secrecy in the context of physical
layer security are both defined in the limit of n → ∞, and
therefore they also are not applicable to URLLC.
Channel state information (CSI) is required in many of
the techniques used to enhance the reliability and security
of wireless communications. However, considering the short
blocklengths required by the ultra-low latency in URLLC,
there may not be the required amount of channel uses that
would be needed for accurate channel estimation. Against
this background, many problems related to CSI in physical
layer security for URLLC are challenging and should be
revisited. The initial challenge is to determine whether (and
when) CSI is required for achieving physical layer security in
URLLC scenarios - a question that is hard to directly clarify
given the limited channel uses. We do note, however, that
communication without the use of CSI may bring one benefit
for physical layer security in URLLC in that it potentially
limits Eve’s channel estimation ability. This could force Eve
to use non-optimal techniques for eavesdropping on Alice’s
confidential information.
In this article we discuss all of the above issues in some
detail - organized as follows. In Section II, we review the
used secrecy performance metrics in the literature and clarify
whether they are applicable to physical layer security in
URLLC scenarios. Challenging problems related to CSI and
potential solutions for achieving and enhancing physical layer
security for URLLC are presented in Section III. We conclude
this article in Section IV.
II. PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR PHYSICAL LAYER
SECURITY IN URLLC
In this section, we review the widely used secrecy perfor-
mance metrics for physical layer security and clarify whether
they can be adopted to quantify the achievable physical layer
security in URLLC scenarios.
A. Information-Theoretic Secrecy Performance Metrics
Perfect secrecy was initially used as the secrecy coding
metric by Shannon, which requires zero mutual information
between M and Xn, where M is the transmitted message
and Xn is a length-n codeword used to transmit M [6].
We note that ‘zero’ mutual information means that the coded
message Xn does not provide any information on the message
M . Perfect secrecy can also be taken to mean the mutual
information between M and Zn is zero, where Zn is the
received symbol at Eve. This means that Eve cannot obtain
any information on the transmitted message M from her
received symbol Zn. The definition of perfect secrecy is valid
for arbitrary values of the codeword length n. As such, it
is suitable for defining secrecy in physical layer security for
URLLC. However, as Shannon proved, perfect secrecy can
only be achieved when the entropy of the secret key is at least
that of the entropy of the transmitted message itself - leading
to the fact that the notion of perfect secrecy is impractical.
Therefore, we can conclude that the perfect secrecy is not
a practical metric for evaluating physical layer security in
URLLC.
Considering the impractical issues of perfect secrecy, weak
secrecy and strong secrecy were proposed as alternative se-
crecy metrics for physical layer security. Weak secrecy is
achieved if the per-channel use mutual information between
M and Zn approaches zero as n approaches infinity, while
strong secrecy is achieved if the total mutual information for
all channel uses approaches zero as n becomes infinite [7].
Although the weak and strong secrecies are achievable by
practical coding strategies [6], as per their definitions, it is
hard to evaluate their uses in URLLC in the context of physical
layer security. This is again due to the fact that their definitions
require n being infinite, while in URLLC n must be finite and
small due to the required ultra-low latency.
In physical layer security, secrecy capacity is another widely
used secrecy metric. In most existing works with secrecy
capacity as the performance metric, it has not been clarified
whether its definition is based on weak secrecy or strong
secrecy. We would like to clarify that secrecy capacity is not
a proper performance metric for physical layer security in
URLLC, no matter whether it is defined based on weak secrecy
or strong secrecy [7]. For example, the widely used secrecy
3Fig. 2. Error probability ǫ versus channel coding rate R for different values
of the finite blocklength n.
capacity is defined as the supremum of the code rate (i.e.,
the information rate) that can achieve weak secrecy (against
a passive Eve) as a function of wiretap channel parameters,
while guaranteeing an arbitrarily low error probability at
Bob [7]. As such, this secrecy capacity cannot be used as
a metric for a finite small n in URLLC, due to the fact
that weak secrecy requires n → ∞. Intuitively, this can be
explained by the fact that the main channel capacity Cb or the
eavesdropper’s channel capacity Ce cannot be achieved with
arbitrarily low error probabilities.
Due to the same reasoning as outlined above, another widely
used secrecy metric, i.e., secrecy outage probability, also
cannot be used to evaluate physical layer security in URLLC
scenarios. For a finite blocklength n, there exists a tradeoff
between the channel coding rate R and the corresponding
error probability ǫ [8]. As n → ∞, this channel coding rate
approaches the channel capacity while ǫ → 0. To further
illustrate this point, in Fig. 2 we plot the error probability
ǫ (its expression is taken from [8]) versus the channel coding
rate R for different values of the blocklength n. In addition to
the tradeoff between R and ǫ, in this figure we observe that
for a fixed R, ǫ increases significantly as n decreases in the
low regime of n. This demonstrates that the error probability
ǫ is not negligible in URLLC. For physical layer security in
URLLC, this non-negligible error probability exists at both
Bob and Eve. As such, a fair secrecy performance metric
should consider the impact of R, ǫ, and n in URLLC scenarios.
B. Non-Information-Theoretic Secrecy Performance Metrics
Considering specific coding schemes (e.g., low-density
parity-check codes), the authors of [9] proposed to use the
so-called security gap as a measure of secrecy - a metric
based on the average bit-error rate (BER). The security
gap is defined as SNRB,min/SNRE,max, where SNRB,min
denotes the reliability threshold and SNRE,max denotes the
security threshold. The reliability threshold is defined as the
lowest signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the main channel that
ensures the reliability requirement that PBBER is not higher
than PBBER,max. Here, P
B
BER is the average BER at Bob, and
PBBER,max(≈ 0) denotes the maximum average BER required
to guarantee the reliability of the communication from Alice
to Bob. The security threshold is defined as the highest
SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel that ensures the security
requirement that PEBER is higher than P
E
BER,min, where P
E
BER
is the average BER at Eve and PEBER,min(≈ 0.5) denotes
the minimum average BER that guarantees a certain level of
secrecy (e.g. Eve cannot extract much information on Alice’s
transmitted message from her received signals). Considering
that the average BER can be evaluated for arbitrary values of
the blocklength n, the proposed security gap can be used to
evaluate physical layer security in URLLC.
Also based on the average BER, the rate interval was
proposed as another secrecy metric to evaluate physical layer
security with a finite blocklength n [10]. Mathematically, the
rate interval is given by ∆R = Rsup − Rinf, where Rsup
is the highest allowable transmission rate to satisfy PBBER
being less than or equal to PBBER,max and Rinf is the lowest
allowable transmission rate to satisfy PEBER being larger than
or equal to PEBER,min. As clarified in [10], the rate interval is
not always positive. When ∆R is positive, Alice is able to
transmit information reliably and securely to Bob. When ∆R
is negative, it is not possible for Alice to set a transmission rate
such that the above two constraints are satisfied simultaneously
and thus Alice’s reliable and secure information transmission
should be suspended. We note that this rate interval converges
to the secrecy capacity as n approaches infinity. This is due to
the fact that, in the limit of n→∞, the main channel capacity
Cb is achievable with an arbitrarily low average BER and Eve
cannot obtain any information on Alice’s transmission as long
as the transmission rate is greater than Ce. For a finite n, as
clarified in [10], Rsup is visibly lower than Cb, but Rinf cannot
be significantly lower than Ce. As such, we may still have the
rate interval being negative even when the secrecy capacity is
positive. This demonstrates the tradeoff among communication
latency, reliability, and security in the context of URLLC, and
indicates that the rate interval can be used as a performance
metric for physical layer security in URLLC.
Determining the expression of the average BER requires
a specified coding scheme. However, general expressions for
the average BER are hard to obtain for coded systems. This is
one issue that works against the aforementioned security gap
and rate interval metrics in the context of URLLC. In order
to overcome this issue, the bit-error cumulative distribution
function (BE-CDF) and bit-error rate cumulative distribution
function (BER-CDF) were proposed as alternative metrics to
replace the average BER for defining the security gap and rate
interval [7]. The calculations of the BE-CDF and BER-CDF
only require the error correction capability of a coding scheme
(which is relatively easier than the calculation of the average
BER), and thus lead to a tractable performance analysis on
physical layer security with a finite n. In addition, as clarified
in [7], the BE-CDF and BER-CDF provide more information
on the BER performance of a system and thus they can offer
a stronger secrecy guarantee for URLLC.
In physical layer security, another secrecy requirement given
a finite blocklength n is that based on the average probability
4Fig. 3. Maximum main channel coding rate Rǫ
b
and minimum eavesdropper’s
channel coding rate Rǫe versus the blocklength n for different values of Bob’s
SNR γb and Eve’s SNR γe, where βb = 10
−6 and βe = 0.5.
of decoding error [11]. In general, this secrecy requirement can
be represented by the reliability constraint that Pne (B) is not
higher than β1, and the security constraint that P
n
e (E) is not
lower than β2, where P
n
e (B) and P
n
e (E) denote the average
probabilities of decoding error at Bob and Eve, respectively.
Here, β1 is the maximum allowable average probability of
decoding error at Bob, and β2 is a lower bound on the
average probability of decoding error at Eve. As mentioned
in [11], the blocklength n should be sufficiently large in
order to simultaneously guarantee the reliability constraint and
the security constraint. As such, these two constraints may
not be simultaneously satisfied for a finite small n (this is
similar to the fact that the rate interval based BER metrics
may not be always positive). This again explicitly shows the
tradeoff among latency, reliability, and security in wireless
communications [12].
In order to further demonstrate the tradeoff among latency,
reliability, and security in URLLC scenarios, we plot Fig. 3
based on the research work of [8]. To this end, we use the error
probability given in [8] to replace the previously discussed
average BER, BE-CDF, BER-CDF, and the average probability
of decoding error. The calculation of the error probability in
[8] does not require a particular coding scheme, the error
correction capability of a coding scheme, or the modulation
method, since this specific error probability approximates
the error probability that can be achieved by any scheme.
Accordingly, the secrecy requirement can be written as the
reliability constraint (ǫB being not higher than βb) and the
security constraint (ǫE being not lower than βe), where ǫB and
ǫE are the error probabilities at Bob and Eve, respectively. The
error probability ǫB monotonically increases with the main
channel coding rate Rb for fixed n, and with the SNR at Bob
γb [13]. This leads to the reliability constraint determining
an upper bound Rǫb on Rb, for fixed n and γb. Likewise,
the security constraint determines a lower bound Rǫe on the
eavesdropper’s channel coding rate Re (for fixed n) and the
SNR at Eve γe. We note that R
ǫ
b and R
ǫ
e correspond to Rsup
Fig. 4. Challenging problems and potential solutions on CSI issues for
physical layer security in URLLC. Here ’Limited CSI’ refers to imperfect
CSI.
and Rinf in the rate interval metric that is defined using BER
metrics. In Fig. 3, we plot Rǫb and R
ǫ
e versus the blocklength
n for different values of γb and γe. We note that the reliability
and security constraints can only be simultaneously satisfied
when Rǫb is not lower than R
ǫ
e. We also note that the curves
for Rǫe are horizontal in Fig. 3. This is due to βe = 0.5, for
which Rǫe is the same as the corresponding channel capacity,
which is not a function of the blocklength n. In this figure, we
also observe that Rǫb, being not lower than R
ǫ
e, is more likely
to be satisfied for a larger n in terms of requiring a smaller
value of γb/γe (which is one type of the security gap). This
once again explicitly demonstrates the tradeoff among latency,
reliability, and security, and indicates that the security gap and
rate interval based on error probability are valid performance
metrics for physical layer security in URLLC scenarios. We
note that the secrecy metrics discussed in this subsection
are non-information-theoretic, which leads to the fact that
the security measured by these metrics are not information-
theoretically guaranteed. However, such security is acceptable
in URLCC scenarios, since the ultra-low latency forces that
the outdated confidential information is of no value [9].
III. CSI ISSUES ON ACHIEVING PHYSICAL LAYER
SECURITY IN URLLC
Current research on physical layer security for URLLC is
in its preliminary stage and further exploration is required. As
such, many challenging issues remain in the implementation of
physical layer security in practical URLLC scenarios, includ-
ing, but not limited to, (i) wiretap coding to simultaneously
meet the latency, reliability, and security requirements, (ii)
designing efficient feedback strategies with optimal tradeoffs
between quantization accuracy and overhead cost, and (iii)
achieving accurate CSI under the constraints of ultra-low la-
tency, ultra-high reliability, and moderate levels of security. As
we clarified previously, CSI plays a critical role in achieving
physical layer security in URLLC, since CSI is required in
many techniques used to enhance wireless communication
reliability and security (e.g., beamforming and artificial-noise-
aided secure transmission schemes). Therefore, in this section,
we first clarify some design challenges related to CSI in
achieving physical layer security in URLLC, and then point
5out some potential techniques to overcome these challenges.
The challenges we raise are schematically shown in Fig. 4.
A. Coherent Communications versus Non-Coherent Commu-
nications
As mentioned in the Introduction, due to the required ultra-
low latency of URLLC, there may not be enough channel
uses to perform channel estimation and feedback during one
communication block. This leads to the necessity of conduct-
ing communications in URLLC where no CSI is estimated or
fed back to a receiver before information transmission. We
refer here to such communications as non-coherent commu-
nications. Actually, non-coherent communications bring one
benefit for physical layer security, i.e., non-coherent commu-
nications do not require any estimation or feedback of the
CSI of the main channel, thus limiting Eve’s opportunity to
obtain the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel. This in turn
reduces the eavesdropping capability of Eve by enforcing her
to use non-coherent communication techniques. Meanwhile,
we note that the unknown CSI also decreases the performance
of the communication from Alice to Bob, i.e., non-coherence
communication leads to a low reliability of the transmission
from Alice to Bob. As such, how to enhance the reliability
of non-coherent communications should be tackled before
applying this technique into URLLC scenarios that attempt
to achieve physical layer security. Therefore, non-coherent
communications have a double-sided impact (reducing latency
but also decreasing reliability) on physical layer security
in URLLC relative to coherent (full CSI) communications.
Accordingly, a significant future research direction for URLLC
is to clarify the conditions under which non-coherent commu-
nications outperform coherent communications, and how much
performance gain can be achieved by each in the context of
physical layer security for URLLC.
B. Channel Inversion Power Control based on Channel Reci-
procity
In some applications (e.g., emergency alert systems), only
uplink or downlink communications require URLLC. In such
applications, channel inversion power control (CIPC) based
on channel reciprocity [14] can be used to overcome the CSI
issues. We use the example where only the uplink from a
user to a base station (BS) requires URLLC and security
to demonstrate this point. Since the downlink communica-
tion does not require low latency, pilots can be periodically
transmitted by the BS such that the user can estimate the
downlink channel hd. When the uplink communication with
URLLC requirement is on demand, the user can use CIPC
based on channel reciprocity (i.e., the uplink channel hu is
the same as hd) to guarantee that the power of the received
signals is a constant Q. We note that Q is a constant value,
which leads to the outcome that the beamformer is h†d/|hd|
and the transmit power varies as per |hu|
2. In this CIPC,
Eve cannot obtain any information on the eavesdropper’s
channel. In addition, the varying Pt increases the uncertainty
on the eavesdropper’s channel, which can further enhance
the physical layer security. Secrecy performance analysis on
this CIPC and the optimization of Q subject to a maximum
transmit power constraint are challenging problems, since the
communication from Alice to Eve is non-coherent with a
random transmit power. We note that there is a limitation
on this CIPC caused by the required channel reciprocity: this
CIPC can only be used in time division duplex (TDD) systems
since channel reciprocity normally does not exist in frequency
division duplex (FDD) systems. In addition, the performance
of this CIPC will be affected by the non-perfect channel
reciprocity in TDD systems and therefore channel reciprocity
calibration should be adopted to counteract this lack of full
reciprocity.
C. Location-Based Beamforming with and without Artificial
Noise
Multi-antenna techniques (e.g., beamforming) are desirable
for enhancing reliability and security in wireless commu-
nications. Such techniques require accurate CSI to achieve
the expected performance gain. However, in URLLC it is
hard or infeasible to obtain accurate CSI due to the ultra-
low latency requirement, since determining a complex channel
matrix costs a large number of channel uses (especially when
the antenna number is large). Against this background, we find
that location-based beamforming can serve as an alternative
solution to improve reliability and security in some URLLC
scenarios where line-of-sight (LOS) components exist in the
channel [15]. Such location-based beamforming, however, can-
not achieve the same level of performance gain as traditional
CSI-based beamforming, but can meet the ultra-low latency
requirement in URLLC since it only requires the relative
location information of the transceivers rather than a complex
channel matrix. The accuracy of the location information and
the weight of the LOS component determines whether (and
how much) the use of artificial noise enhances the secrecy
performance of the location-based beamforming.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Due to its low complexity, physical layer security is able
to provide security without violating ultra-low latency re-
quirements, and potentially serves as the main technique to
enable security in URLLC. In this article, we identified the
security gap and rate interval as two useful performance
metrics for evaluating physical layer security in the context of
URLLC. We also provided wider guidelines on analyzing and
enhancing physical layer security in the context of URLLC.
Furthermore, we clarified critical issues related to the use
of CSI in achieving physical layer security in URLLC, and
presented potential techniques to overcome these issues.
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